NCLAT: NCLTs and NCLAT have the power to recall their Judgments

A five-member bench of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (“NCLAT”) in the case of Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 729 of 2020], in its judgment dated May 25, 2023, held that NCLAT can recall its judgments by the virtue of inherent power vested in the NCLAT under Rule 11 (Inherent Powers) of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 (“Rules”) in case of a procedural error while delivering the earlier judgment.

Facts

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) was initiated against Amtek Auto Limited (“Corporate Debtor”) by an application filed by Union Bank of India (“Appellant”) under Section 7 (Initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process by financial creditor) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) and thereafter a resolution plan was approved by the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) by majority voting share of 70.07% on January 11, 2020 (“Resolution Plan”).

An interlocutory application was filed by the resolution professional seeking the approval of the Resolution Plan. Further, Appellant while praying for modification of the Resolution Plan filed an interlocutory application. The National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh (“NCLT”), vide an order dated July 9, 2020 (“Order”), approved the Resolution Plan by allowing the interlocutory application filed by the resolution professional and dismissed interlocutory application filed by Appellant.

Appellant filed an appeal against the Order, wherein the Appellant did not implead the CoC as one of the parties which was partly allowed by NCLAT, vide its judgement dated January 27, 2022 (“NCLAT Order”). Consequently, the financial creditors filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India (“SC”) against the NCLAT Order, which was dismissed by the SC, vide an order dated April 1, 2022 (“SC Order”), as ‘withdrawn with liberty to file a review application’.

After the SC Order, a review application was filed by the financial creditors which was dismissed by NCLAT vide an order dated September 2, 2022, and it was held that there exists no provision under IBC for a review and thus the application is not maintainable before the NCLAT. The NCLAT also noted that the financial creditors may take recourse to its other remedy in accordance with law against the NCLAT Order. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the present appeal was filed before the NCLAT to recall the NCLAT Order (“Appeal”).

The case was first heard by a three-member bench of the NCLAT, which referred this matter to a five-member special bench. During the proceedings before the three-member bench of NCLAT, the bench relied on the judgement wherein it was held that no jurisdiction lies with NCLT and NCLAT for any review or recall of their judgments.

Issues

Whether NCLAT possesses power to entertain an application for recall of its judgment.

Whether judgment of NCLAT in the case of Agarwal Coal Corporation Private Limited v. Sun Paper Mill Limited and Another [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 412 of 2019] (“Agarwal Coal Case”) and Rajendra Mulchand Varma and Others v. K. L. J Resources Limited and Another [Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 359 of 2020] (“Rajendra Mulchand Case”) can be read to mean that there is no power vested in NCLAT to recall a judgment and thus, lay down the correct law.

Arguments

Contentions of the Appellant:

It was contended by the Appellant that the inherent power of NCLAT is preserved by virtue of Rule 11 of the Rules. Further, NCLAT can use its inherent power to recall a judgment in appropriate case. The Appellant also submitted that a judgment delivered by NCLAT can be recalled wherein the necessary party was earlier not present before the NCLAT. Additionally, it was contended by the Appellant that an order passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party violates the principles of natural justice and thus, deserves to be recalled.

It was submitted that the judgment of NCLAT in the cases of Agarwal Coal Case and Rajendra Mulchand Case, wherein it was held that NCLAT cannot exercise its jurisdiction to review or recall its judgement, does not lay down the correct law as NCLAT has jurisdiction to recall a judgment on the grounds of being satisfied that there exists a procedural error in delivery of a judgment by the NCLAT.

In order to substantiate its arguments, the Appellant relied upon the following judgements of the SC: (a) A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and Another [(1988) 2 SCC 602], wherein the SC has put forth various grounds to set-aside judgments: (i) if a party has had no notice and decree is made against him, he can approach the court for setting-aside the decision on proof of the fact that there was no service, (ii) if a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all and was shown as served or in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had died and the estate was not represented, or (iii) a judgment was obtained by fraud; (b) Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal and Others [(2009) 2 SCC 703], the SC had drawn the distinction between review and recall petition. It was noted by the SC that “…while in a review petition the Court considers on merits where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party…”; (c) Indian Bank v. M/s Satyam Fibres India Private Limited [AIR 1996 SC 2592], wherein it was held that the courts have inherent power to recall and set aside an order if it is obtained by fraud practised upon the court, or when the court is misled by a party, or when the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party; (d) Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited and Another [(2005) 13 SCC 777], the SC noted the nature of power of review and held that the power of court or quasi-judicial authority to review its judgment must be conferred by law expressly; (e) SERI Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Tuff Drilling Private Limited [(2018) 11 SCC 470], wherein it was held that every tribunal has an inherent power of review where such review is sought for a procedural defect.

Contentions of the Respondent:

Mr. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian (“Respondent”) submitted that the Respondent was the only party impleaded in the interlocutory application filed by the Appellant before the NCLAT. Therefore, it was contended by the Respondent that when the Order was challenged by Appellant for rejecting the said interlocutory application, Appellant was not required to implead any other party to the Appeal.

It was also contended by the Respondent that the NCLAT Order which the Appellant sought to be recalled contains no error as it was delivered post hearing all the parties to the Appeal.

Observations of the NCLAT

It was observed that power to recall is not to rehear the case to find out any apparent error in the judgment. However, NCLAT while exercising its inherent jurisdiction can entertain an application for recall of judgment based on sufficient grounds of procedural errors. The NCLAT while deciding the present case took into consideration the judgements in Agarwal Coal Case and Rajendra Mulchand Case and observed that the judgments lay down an incorrect law. It was observed that the power to recall a judgment is an inherent power of the NCLAT as enshrined under Rule 11 of the Rules.

Decision of the NCLAT

In the present case, it was held by NCLAT that in case of any procedural errors, NCLAT has the power to recall its judgement.

Further, NCLAT held that the judgments of NCLAT in the Agarwal Coal Case and Rajendra Mulchand Case does not lay down the correct law and therefore, these two judgements were partly set aside by the NCLAT to the extent that NCLAT does not have the power to recall its orders/ judgments and upheld the said judgments in respect to the portion wherein it observed that the NCLAT was not vested with the power of review.

VA View

This is a positive interpretation as it would ultimately reduce litigation on account of procedural errors. The power to recall a judgement was already permitted by Rule 11 of the Rules which has been strengthened by NCLAT in the present case. This judgment would help to reduce the number of appeals filed in NCLT/ NCLAT and put an end to the review applications being filed by fraudulent litigants, masquerading as recall applications.

This judgement strengthens the power of a tribunal (NCLT as well as NCLAT) to recall its judgements.

For any query, please write to Mr. Bomi Daruwala at [email protected]

Madras High Court rejects enforcement of a foreign arbitration award which was passed without considering FEMA violations and fraud in share valuations

In a landmark verdict, the Hon’ble Madras High Court (“Madras HC”), in the case of Aapico Hitech Public Company Limited and Another v. Sakthi Auto Component Limited [Arbitration Original Petition No. 296 of 2021] (“Judgement”), in its judgment dated February 3, 2023, has rejected enforcement of a foreign arbitration award on the ground that it was passed without considering the fraud and violations of regulation of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (“FEMA”), which were not curable.

Facts

Aapico Hitech Public Company Limited is a public listed company under the laws of Thailand (“Aapico Thailand”), Aapico Investment Private Limited is a company under the laws of Singapore (“Aapico Singapore”) (collectively, “Aapico Group”), and Sakthi Global Auto Holdings Limited (“SGAH”) is a company formed under the laws of England and Wales (collectively, “Petitioners”). Sakthi Auto Component Limited (“SACL/ Respondent”) is a public unlisted company formed under the laws of India, which is an affiliate of the Sakthi group of companies.

Around 2017, Aapico Group and SACL formed a joint venture by the name SGAH (“JV”), in which 74.9% shares were to be held by ABT Auto (“ABT”), 24.1% by Aapico Thailand, and 1% by Aapico Singapore, and SGAH was to become 70% owner SACL’s subsidiary in the U.S.A. (“SG-USA”). Initially, Aapico Group agreed to invest $100 million into the JV – $50 million in form of equity and $50 million by way of loan agreements, secured by guarantees given by Dr. Mahalingam (founder and controller of SACL) and by ABT (“Loan Agreements”). In 2018, owing to the financial crisis faced by SG-USA, Aapico Group provided another injection of funds of $65 million – $25 million in the form of equity capital, taking Aapico Group’s shareholding in SGAH to 49.99%. The said loan from Aapico Group was on the terms of an amended and restated loan agreement dated September 29, 2018 namely, shareholder’s agreement (“SHA”). ABT had also provided a charge over its shares in SGAH (around 50.01%) dated October 1, 2018 in order to secure the amounts due under the Loan Agreements.

Aapico Group alleged defaults under the Loan Agreements on June 4, 2019 and took over complete control of the board of SGAH. Subsequently, on August 15, 2019, by enforcing the charged shares, Aapico Group appropriated 50.01% shares of ABT, thereby becoming 100% equity holder of SGAH, and a 77.04% holder of SACL, indirectly. The value of appropriated shares, based on valuation report dated July 31, 2019 tendered by FIZ Consulting LLP, was around $27 million. Aapico Group and SGAH invoked the arbitration before Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”) in terms of the SHA in respect of, inter alia, controlling and managing rights, including proportionate representation on the board of SACL, right to appoint nominee director on the board of SACL, etc. The SIAC passed its arbitration award on October 6, 2021 in favour of the Petitioners (“Award”). The Petitioners consequently approached the Madras HC, seeking enforcement of the Award in terms of Section 47 (Evidence) and Section 49 (Enforcement of foreign awards) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).

Issue

Whether the Award satisfied the conditions under the Arbitration Act to be enforced as a decree in India.

Arguments

Contentions of the Petitioners:

Aapico Group contended that they had 100% shares in SGAH and also became the holder of 77.04% in SACL. However, despite its shareholding in SACL, Aapico Group was being prevented from exercising their management rights/ control of SACL under the SHA by the entities of Sakthi Group which was a breach of the SHA. Thus, the arbitration before SIAC was initiated and the Award was passed. Accordingly, the Madras HC should allow the enforcement of Award.

The Petitioners further contended that the Award was not contrary to the public policy of India and was in compliance of Section 47 and 48 (Conditions for enforcement of foreign awards) of the Arbitration Act. It was further contended that the burden of proof fell upon the party who resists the enforcement of the Award and in the present case, on the Respondent since it had resisted the enforcement of the Award. In this regard, reliance was placed on the on the judgment of the Supreme Court (“SC”) in Gemini Bay Transcription Private Limited v. Integrated Sales Service Limited [(2022) 1 SCC 753], wherein it was held that ‘unless a party is able to show that its case comes clearly within the Section 48(1) or 48(2) of the Arbitration Act, the foreign Award, must be enforced’, this court cannot refuse the enforcement of the Award.

The Petitioners argued that although the Respondent brought in some new documents and raised supplementary grounds, those documents did not form part of the records of the SIAC for passing the Award. In this regard, the Petitioners placed reliance on the judgment of the SC in LMJ International Limited v. Sleepwell Industries [(2019) 5 SCC 302] to contend that the alleged non-suppression of documents is not a fraud that can be attributed against the Petitioners and further, it fell outside the purview of Section 48 of the Arbitration Act.

Contentions of the Respondent:

The Respondent contended that the enforcement of the Award was opposed to the basic notions and justice of India and was against the public policy of India. The Respondent contended that the Petitioners had suppressed various important documents, despite being asked by the SIAC tribunal, vide its procedural order dated June 20, 2022. The Respondent also contended that the Award was obtained by fraud on account of suppression of vital documents and on this ground only the Madras HC should reject the enforcement of the Award. In this regard, the Respondent placed its reliance on the various judgments of the SC wherein it was held that an enforcement of an Award obtained by fraud was liable to be rejected and set aside. The Respondent also contended that the Petitioners had, in the guise of being JV partners, colluded behind its back with the Portuguese executives to topple and purchase its step-down subsidiary in Portugal, thus orchestrating fraud on the Respondent, causing it a loss of around INR 1000 crores.

Observations of the Madras HC

At the outset, the Madras HC observed that generally the court will not interfere with the enforcement of a foreign award unless the same is hit by Section 48 of the Arbitration Act.

The Madras HC observed that the Respondent had borrowed a sum of INR 22,353 Lakhs from Kotak Mahindra Bank (“KMB”) and KMB had issued a sanction letter dated September 11, 2018 (“Sanction Letter”) which clearly stated that “…Any change in the shareholding/ Directorship/ partnership/ ownership shall be undertaken with the prior permission of the bank…” The said Sanction Letter was also approved by the board of SACL. No prior permission was obtained for the change of the directorship and the shareholding pattern of SACL and further that the Petitioner had suppressed this fact before the SIAC. The Award, which had the effect of allowing complete change of the directorship and the shareholding pattern of SACL, was therefore in breach and in conflict with the notion of justice in India. Thus, Madras HC observed that the Award was liable to be rejected on this ground itself and could not be allowed to be enforced under the Arbitration Act. The Madras HC also observed that it would not in blind-fold manner grant the enforcement of the Award when a plea of fraud has been brought to the notice of the court. The Madras HC observed that Aapico Group was one of the JV partners of the Respondent, and in that capacity, they had purchased the share of the step-down subsidiary of the Respondent in Portugal. The Madras HC observed that such action of the Petitioner was clearly a fraud within the meaning of Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.

The Madras HC also observed that there were serious violations of FEMA and the Foreign Exchange Management Transfer or Issue of any Foreign Security Regulations, 2004 (“Transfer Regulations”), which were not curable. The Madras HC observed that Regulations 16 (Transfer by way of sale of shares of a JV/WOS outside India) and 18 (Pledge of shares of Joint Ventures (JV), and Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) and step down Subsidiary (SDS)) of the Transfer Regulations, inter alia¸ mandated prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India before enforcement of any rights of transfer of shares by virtue of pledge. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of the SC in the case of Vijay Karia v. Prysmian [(2020) 11 SCC 1] wherein it was, inter alia, observed that any loss of foreign exchange to the country affected the public and economy at large and amounted to breach of fundamental policy of India, when the violations of FEMA was not curable. The Madras HC observed the Petitioners had caused the exchequer a loss of sum of around INR 822 Crores.

Decision of the Madras HC

The Madras HC held that the enforcement of the Award was liable to be rejected under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act for the reason that it was orchestrated and also there was violations of FEMA and Transfer Regulations coupled with the commission of fraud on the part of the Petitioner in valuing the SGAH shares, which was not curable in nature and the Award was passed without taking in consideration the said commission of fraud and violations of FEMA and the related regulations.

VA View

The Madras HC refused to allow the enforcement of the Award as a decree since it was against the public policy of India. Madras HC has categorically demonstra ted as to how the Petitioners orchestrated fraud against the Respondent and how the Petitioners also flouted the provisions of the FEMA, which was incurable in nature. The SIAC tribunal had failed to consider the fraud coupled with the violations of the FE MA.

The Madras HC has rightly given primacy to public interest over private interest. Whenever, there is loss of foreign exchange to the nation due to fraud , there is a dent on the economy which in turn hampers the public interest of the nation. Where su ch violations are incurable, such Award which are passed without considering such violations should not be allowed to be enforced as a decree in India.

For any query, please write to Mr. Bomi Daruwala at [email protected]